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We conduct a case study of the linkages of task organization, human capital accumulation and wages in 
Morocco, using matched worker-firm data for Electrical-mechanical and Textile-clothing industries. In 
order to integrate task organization into the interacting processes of workers’ training and remunerations, 
we assume a recursive model, which is not rejected by our estimates: task organization influences on-the-
job training that affects wages. Beyond sector and gender determinants, assignment of workers to tasks and 
on-the-job training is found to depend on former education and work experience in a broad sense. 
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textile sector and for well-educated workers. Finally, task organization and on-the-job training are found to 
affect wages. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1. The issues 
In this case study, we examine how task organization and On-the-Job Training 
(OJT) interact with human capital accumulation and earnings of workers in eight 
Moroccan firms in the Textile-clothing and Electrical-mechanical industries. 
In most human capital theories, wage differentials between individuals are 
determined by their differences in education, experience and on-the-job training. In this 
perspective, market forces are often seen as equalizing individuals’ earnings, provided 
human capital endowments are identical. However, how task allocation and OJT affect 
these mechanisms is generally neglected.  
In this paper, we scrutinize the interrelationships between task organization, 
human capital accumulation, OJT and wages. For this, we use a matched worker-firm 
dataset that provides detailed information on workers’ attributes for a few manufacturing 
plants. Our analysis should be viewed as a case study since our data may not represent the 
manufacturing sectors in Morocco perfectly. Case studies in developing countries are 
appealing as there is a persistent lack of knowledge on how workers’ human capital and 
earnings can be improved in connection with work organization and OJT. Human capital 
accumulation in firms through OJT should depend on task allocation, as different 
techniques are used in different posts, and the opportunities of learning from co-workers 
vary across differently organized groups of workers. 
 
1.2. The literature 
Few empirical studies have incorporated task organization within firms when 
studying how workers benefit from human capital or how wages are determined. Yet, 
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task organization may be a major transmission channel of human capital across workers. 
Lindbeck and Snower (2000) emphasize this (p. 356):  
 “In the new types of firms emerging nowadays, the traditional separation of roles 
tends to break down. Workers are often given responsibilities spanning more than 
one of the traditional groupings. Greater emphasis is now also placed on continuous 
learning and skill development, all-round knowledge, the potential to acquire 
multiple skills, and the ability to learn how the experience gained from one skill 
enhances another skill.” 
 
A few authors report the emerging new forms of work organization in 
industrialized countries since the mid-1980s, starting from the Japanese flexible company 
model (OECD, 1999; Osterman, 2000). It is sometimes possible to recognize some 
prominent features: growing role for team work and job rotation, reduction in the number 
of management levels, development of workers’ versatility and continuous learning, 
notably through OJT, decentralization of responsibilities within firms, and direct 
participation of employees in decision making in multiple dimensions. There is no reason 
why such innovation should not extend to firms in LDCs. 
Some authors have explored theoretical macroeconomic explanations on how new 
work organization emerged. Greenan and Guellec (1994) analyze the impact on growth of 
ways of processing and communicating information in firms. Thesmar and Thoenig 
(2000) study the macroeconomic growth implications of the organizational structure of 
firms. Lindbeck and Snower (2000) examine the forces driving the restructuring process 
in firms. Caroli, Greenan and Guellec (2001) formalize the link between human capital 
accumulation and organizational changes. The latter show that, in industrialized 
countries, the relative increase in skilled workers may impulse the decentralization of 
work organization. They advocate amplifying the range of workers’ skills, in particular 
through OJT,  to yield further decentralization of firm organization. 
 4 
Those works emphasize the relevance of linking within-firm task organization, 
human capital accumulation and wages. Nevertheless, to our knowledge, no empirical 
study has focused on these issues using matched worker-firm data on a developing 
country.   
 What are the determinants of within-firm task organization in exporting firms in 
Morocco? How does work organization influence on-the-job training? How do these two 
variables affect wages? We explore these questions. We start by discussing the Moroccan 
labour market in Section 2. We present the data in Section 3 and our model in Section 4. 
We comment on the estimation results in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The Moroccan Labour Market 
2.1. The general context 
Morocco is a semi-developed economy with a fast evolving working population. 
During the 1990s, social indicators much improved following public social expenditure 
and better focus of social policies on rural areas (The World Bank, 2001). In the last 
decade, Morocco has enjoyed sustained economic growth, with an average annual growth 
rate of about 5 percent, almost twice its average growth rate in the 1990s (The World 
Bank, 2012).  
Yet, poverty and vulnerability were found to be on the rise at the time of the 
survey we use. Household surveys in Morocco (LSMS) show that the poor rose from 13.1 
percent of the population in 1990/91 to 19 percent in 1998/99. Explanations of these high 
poverty figures can be found in sluggish GDP growth, drop in agricultural value-added 
after several droughts, collapse in employment creation and growing inequality in rural 
areas.  
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More recent data on poverty and labour market are scarce in Morocco.
1
 However, 
according to the Morocco Household and Youth Survey (MHYS) from 2009/10 (The 
World Bank, 2012), 49 percent of Moroccan youth are neither in school nor in the 
workforce. In such circumstances, a crucial question is whether better education and 
training can lead to large earnings increases as is often the case in developing countries.
2
  
In the following, we refer to figures pertaining to the time period of the survey 
data we collected for this study, that is the late nineties. About one third of the Moroccans 
were under 15 years old, while the decreasing fertility rate was still at 3.1 percent in 
2000. Moreover, large inter-urban and rural-urban migrations took place. For these 
reasons, the Moroccan labour market was tight in peri-urban areas where many exporting 
firms were concentrated. However, although job searchers were abundant, skills were 
scarce. More than half the adults were illiterate, this proportion being much higher for 
women. According to census data, illiteracy even averaged 80 percent among rural adults 
aged 35-49 years in 2004 (The World Bank, 2012). 
While half the population worked in agriculture, the Textile industry stood as a 
major employment sector (42 percent of industrial employment, 60 percent for female 
labour). Textile production increased by 7.75 percent per year between 1986 and 1998, 
and contributed to 11 percent of exports (Intermon, 2003). Most garment companies 
corresponded to small sized families where minimum wage, social security and legal 
contracts were not enforced. Meanwhile, a few modern firms accounted for the bulk of 
human capital investment in this sector. We focus on such firms and on electrical-
mechanical companies, another pillar of the Moroccan exporting industry. 
                                                
1 The forthcoming data on the new household panel data survey conducted by the ONDH of Rabat are 
likely to relax this constraint. 
2See for example Sahn and Alderman (1988) and Behrman (1999). 
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In Morocco, human capital and labour remuneration issues are stimulated by the 
intensifying international competition in the exporting sectors. The export-oriented 
restructuring of the Moroccan economy was initiated during the 1983 adjustment 
programme (Morrisson, 1991). Foreign trade liberalisation was fostered as early as 1986, 
culminating with several association agreements with the European Union (1995), the 
free trade agreement with the US (2004) and the building of a new industrial port in 
Tanger in 2005. Moreover, from 1989, a large privatisation programme of public firms 
went under way. In 2005, China entered the WTO, which generated fierce competition 
for Moroccan products in Europe, especially since the quotas of the multi-fibre agreement 
were simultaneously eliminated. These new threats on the Moroccan textile and other 
exporting firms had adverse consequences for employment and wages. In the textile 
sector, 75000 jobs were destroyed in 2005 in Morocco, and many firms shut down
3
. Only 
firms producing small series and luxury goods seem to be able to stand the Chinese 
competition, in the absence of modernisation. In 2006, Moroccan exports fell down to 
below six billions Euros. Although aggregate wages do not seem to have much suffered, 
wages in exporting firms have dropped.  
In this situation, upgrading skills and human capital appears as one way of 
generating the required productivity gains in order to face competition. Cammett (2007) 
shows how upgrading in the apparel sector largely originates from industrialists and 
business associations, with subsequent state engagement. 
In this paper, we concentrate on exporting firms, which are believed to be 
amongst the most efficient firms. As a matter of fact, inefficient firms cannot compete on 
international markets (Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998). 
 
                                                
3 Nevertheless, the (controversial) official statistics show a drop in the general unemployment rate from 11 
percent to 7.7 percent between 2005 and 2006. 
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2.2. Wage formation 
In Morocco, the labour legislation underpins the level of wages. Unions enjoy a 
strong influence. Although the minimum wage (SMIG, Salaire minimum 
interprofessionnel garanti) is not enforced in the informal sector of the economy, it is 
much better implemented throughout the industrialised and unionized sectors. These 
workers are generally paid between 13 and 16 salary months per year, including bonuses. 
The SMIG did not much affect wages during the 1980s, when real wages of the 
Moroccan manufacturing sector declined, while the real SMIG increased by about 25 
percent. During the 1990s, the SMIG increments shadowed the shifts in the mean urban 
wage more than proportionally (The World Bank, 1994). Thus, the partial vanishing of 
the differential between mean urban wage and SMIG contributed to reducing wage 
dispersion. Besides, the 52 percent SMIG hike between 1989 and 1994 cannot be 
explained by the sole change in the cost of living (35 percent over this period). The 
monthly SMIG (1659 Dirhams
4
), which had not been updated since 1996, was raised by 
10 percent in 2000.  
A few authors studied the functioning of the labour market in Morocco. Lane, 
Hakim and Miranda (1999) underline the stagnation of the average wage in the 
manufacturing sector over the 1990s. They show that considerable gaps in average wages 
persist across sectors. The least remunerative industrial sectors are those of Leather and 
Confection, while the sectors of Drinks and Tobacco correspond to the higher mean 
wages which is more than three times higher in 1995 than those in the Confection 
Sector
5
. The least remunerative industries had the largest share of job creation during the 
past decade, which is believed to explain much of the wage stagnation.  
                                                
4 147 US dollars of 2001. 
5 In the industrial sector, the annual average wage - ratio of mass salary to permanent employment - 
amounted in 1995 to 34 963 Dirhams, that is 2 914 monthly Dirhams.  
 8 
 
2.3. Labour laws 
Skills of the labour force and competition largely explain wage disparities across 
sectors (as in Clerides et al., 1998). Our data confirm this while other factors intervene, 
notably labour laws. Legally, the minimum wage is not applied to certain types of 
employees, such as young workers below 18 years old, temporary workers or trainees. 
Furthermore, in 1986, at least half the firms of the Moroccan private manufacturing 
sector and 40 percent of large companies over 100 employees pay unskilled workers an 
average wage below the SMIG
6
. Meanwhile, only 3 percent of firms in this sector pay 
skilled workers below the minimum wage.  
The statutory frame of the Moroccan labour market is stiff. Until recently, 
working relations were governed by laws dating back to 1921 that strongly emphasized 
job security so that dismissing permanent workers was expensive
7
. The law provided for 
a 48-hours maximum workweek with no more than 10 hours a day, premium pay for 
overtime, paid public and annual holidays, and minimum conditions for health and safety, 
including prohibition of night work for women and minors.  
The former labour code, combined with the slow pace of the law, contributed to 
making human resources management more expensive in Morocco (The World Bank, 
1999). However, the recently adopted labour code (July 2003) encourages flexibility and 
conciliation. The new code reflects international conventions regarding the protection of 
children, women, handicapped people, workers and unions’ rights. 
Temporary workers bring flexibility to the Moroccan labour market, although this 
is acquired at the cost of employment stability and accompanying investment in human 
                                                
6 See the World Bank (1994). Females are more likely than males to be paid a wage below the SMIG.  
7 Workers are considered permanent when they can justify more than a year of job seniority.  
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capital (Lane et al., 1999)
8
. Job precariousness not only diminishes the worker’s personal 
interest in her training in the firm, but also deters human capital investment from 
employers. Statistics from the Direction de la Statistique on the creation of industrial 
employment in 1995 exhibit the prominence of seasonal jobs at a rate of 80 percent. 
These jobs, contributing for 19 percent to total employment in the transformation 
industries, grew by 8 percent compared to 1994, while permanent jobs increased only by 
1 percent. Moreover, many workers access the labour market through informal networks, 
frequently relying on family or personal links (El Aoufi, 1997; Lenoir, 2003). We now 
discuss the data used in the estimation. 
 
3. The Moroccan matched worker-firm data 
A survey at the employee’s workplace was conducted to produce a sample of 
matched worker-firm data in Morocco
9
. The data include information on each worker in 
the surveyed firms: individual characteristics (matrimonial status, number of dependent 
children, geographic origin), wages, educational investment (years of schooling at the 
primary, secondary and upper levels, university or vocational degrees), post-school 
training (apprenticeship, internships, formal training within the current firm), experience 
in the labour market and occupation in the current firm. The data combine these workers’ 
characteristics with the characteristics of the firms in which they work.  
A sample of 187 individuals was interviewed during summer 1997 (Nordman, 
2000). Year 1997 was an exceptionally good agricultural year, which stimulated the whole 
economy. The survey was completed in January 2000 when the employees of an additional 
                                                
8 High welfare costs in the formal private sector (from 21.7 to 35 percent of gross wage) increased the cost of 
permanent workers and detered firms of the informal sector of joining the formal economy. 
9 The methodology of the Moroccan survey is further described in Nordman (2000) and Destré and Nordman 
(2002). Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in this paper are in Tables 1 and 2 of the 
Appendix. 
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firm were included in the sample, which now amounts to 203 individuals matched with 8 
firms. The firms were selected on criteria of size (not less than 50 employees), activity, 
vocation to export and capital ownership. Firms not exporting their production or foreign 
owned were not retained in the sample
10
. Employers have been asked about their firm’s 
characteristics, including: workforce composition, work organization, training and 
communication practices, organizational or technical innovations, competitiveness. The 
observed occupational structure within each firm was used to constitute representative 
sub-samples of their workers. These surveyed workers were randomly chosen within each 
occupation strata and not less than 10 percent of the manpower was interviewed.  
In these data, four firms belong to the Textile-clothing sector located in the Tanger 
area and four firms to the Mechanics, Metallurgical, Electrical and Electronics Industries 
(IMMEE or Electrical-Mechanical industries to shorten) in the Casablanca area. We 
therefore conduct a case study. However, a few summary statistics show that these firms 
exhibit relevant characteristics. The average size of the surveyed establishments is 230 
employees. 54.1 percent of the employees work in the Textile sector and 45.9 percent in 
the IMMEE. The proportion of female in the overall worker sample amounts to 49.8 
percent.  
Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix report descriptive statistics on the workers’ 
characteristics and monthly wages. The mean schooling year is 9.8 years (standard 
deviation 9.7). It is calculated from the workers’ questionnaires, using the available 
information on the highest level of education reached by the workers. When this variable is 
calculated from the age at the end of school, from which we deduct 6 years, the average 
number of years of schooling is close to 13 years. The education variable we use is net 
                                                
10 The survey was designed to concentrate on Moroccan exporting firms, i.e firms belonging to the formal 
manufacturing sector of the Moroccan economy. The survey purpose was to investigate the conditions under 
which employees’ workplace learning occurs and its association with the firms’ organizational features. 
Therefore, firms with too few salaries were excluded from the investigation.  
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from repeated classes (accounting for the observed unsuccessful years of education
11
) in 
order to avoid overestimating education
12
. 5.4 percent of the workers have had no 
schooling, 16.7 percent have completed only primary education (1 to 5 years), 65.5 percent 
have reached an educational level of 6 to 12 years (secondary school) and 11.8 percent 
have completed studies in higher education. 33 percent of employees have a vocational 
diploma related to their current job. 
The average tenure in the current firm is 6 years (4.3 years for females, 7.4 years 
for males). Total professional experience is on average 8.7 years (10 years for males, 6 
years for females). Previous experience off the current job is on average 2.7 years (1.2 
years for females, 3.9 years for males). 14 percent of the employees have worked in their 
firm for at least three years without any previous work experience. The large overall ratio 
of tenure to overall work experience, equal to 69 percent, is due to the presence of 
numerous young workers. Indeed, the average age of workers is 30 years, with six workers 
observed under 17 years old and none under 15 years old. 17 individuals are paid under the 
SMIG of 1996: 1659 Dirhams. Then, studied firms do not massively employ under age or 
pay below the SMIG, as sometimes mentioned for Morocco (Intermon, 2003). 
Let us look at a few wage characteristics. The average monthly wage of the 
surveyed employees is 228 US dollars
13
, 1.3 times greater in the IMMEE. Moreover, the 
average male wage is 1.5 times higher than that of females. It has been claimed that 
training and experience are similarly remunerated across genders in the export textile 
industry (Bourquia, 1999). In general, differences in human capital endowments across 
gender and sector may contribute to explaining wage differentials. Indeed, the workers’ 
                                                
11 Angrist and Lavy (1997) estimate the number of repeated classes at 2 to 3 years in Morocco. In our 
survey, this number is about 4 years and is calculated from the highest school certificate or diploma and the 
age at the end of studies. 
12 See on this point Behrman and Birdsall (1983). 
13 The average monthly wage corresponds to 1.6 times the minimum wage (SMIG). The declared monthly 
wages are those of May and March 1997 for 90 percent of the sample and of December 1999 for the rest. 
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average education in the textile sector is 11.1 years against 15 years in the IMMEE. Given 
that the clothing sector is the lowest wage manufacturing sector in Morocco, the inter-
industry wage differential could explain part of the gender wage gap. However, the 
proportion of female workers in the two sectors is similar. This reinforces the suspicion of 
wage discrimination against females even if female workers are generally less experienced. 
 
 
4.  The Model 
Our estimation strategy is to use a simple recursive model in order to guide the data 
analysis, particularly in terms of the correlations between classical human capital 
accumulation, task organization, OJT and wage determination. We shall check that the 
estimated correlations are consistent with the expected signs according to our model. 
Another approach would have been to estimate a simultaneous model of task allocation, 
OJT and wage determination, relying on instrumental variables to ensure the identification 
of the effect of explanatory variables. Unfortunately, this approach, which we tried and 
rejected, is not possible with the small sample size and without exceptional instruments. In 
these conditions, using a recursive model is a tractable alternative approach. The recursive 
setting is assumed under the untestable assumption that there is no correlation of the errors 
of the different equations of interest since these equations correspond to (assumed) slightly 
lagged events. We work under this hypothesis, which constitutes a convenient device for 
extracting meaningful insight from limited data. Alternatively, instead of causal inferences, 
the results may be seen as reflecting mere correlations between variables, which is still of 
interest. 
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We model the data generating process (DGP) as resulting from four stages. First, 
we state some ‘initial conditions’ for firms and workers: education and other classical 
human capital endowments (i.e. former experience and tenure), industry (textile-clothing 
or IMMEE), worker’s sex, family situation (notably marital status and number of children). 
These conditions are permanent or long-term characteristics of the studied sample of 
workers and firms. 
In a second stage, we consider that the firm chooses its task organization and its 
labour inputs, the latter either through recruitment or by allocating former workers to either 
former or new posts. These choices are likely to be heavily determined by the technology 
used in each industry. Only a few dimensions of these work organization decisions have 
been observed: whether each observed worker works in a production line, whether each 
observed worker performs her/his tasks in a team, whether each observed worker is a 
supervisor or an executive. These exclusive possibilities summarize our knowledge about 
the work organization in the firm. It is interesting to consider them at an early stage of the 
DGP as they are likely to determine the OJT that should be related to the worker’s role in 
the firm’s task organization, and therefore to the worker’s productivity and remuneration in 
this role. 
In a third stage, the firm makes decisions about OJT for each worker, conditionally 
on their initial characteristics, and on the previous task organization decisions. Finally, at a 
last stage of the assumed DGP, each worker’s remuneration, observed as her/his wage, is 
determined as a function of: the initial conditions, its place in the firm’s work organization 
and the previous or actual OJT of the worker. 
This recursive model provides us with an interpretation grid to deal with a topic not 
addressed in the literature: how work organization and OJT interact in the workplace and 
both contribute to salary determination? 
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In particular, we shall be able to: 
(1) Estimate the determinants of task organization and OJT, instead of 
considering them as predetermined; 
(2) Test if there is a role for task organization and OJT in wage 
determination, as opposed to the usual specification of wage equations 
where these aspects are implicitly assumed to have been ‘ironed out’ by 
the labour market. 
However, since we deal with a one-period case study, we shall not be able to say 
much about precise causal relationship, sample selection and endogeneity problems – 
admittedly important issues – but beyond the reach of these data. 
Let us turn with more details to the variables to include as correlates of the 
dependent variables at each stage of the model. Clearly, what we defined as ‘initial 
conditions’ may affect each of the stages as these variables describe the main 
characteristics of firms and markets. They include for each worker: sex, age, matrimonial 
situation, number of dependent children, geographical origin, education (number of years 
of schooling, Koranic school, illiterate, job-related – or not – vocational degree), former 
apprenticeship, former internship (relevant or not for the present job), tenure, off-firm 
experience, unemployment spells; and for the firm: firm dummy and activity sector. We 
avail of these variables to investigate the determination of stages two and three, i.e. task 
organization and OJT.  
Finally, the wage equation cumulates most available explanatory variables, either as 
direct determinants, such as for the typical introduction of education, experience and 
tenure, or indirectly through task organization and OJT variables. 
Although, we deal with a case study, one may wonder if the observed firms, more 
modern and export-oriented than many Moroccan firms, select or attract workers of higher 
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unobserved productivity or more motivated workers. We investigate the issue of sample 
selectivity by using a truncated regression model for wage equations. 
(1) iii uXY 1111    if Y1i ≥ Y2i , and unobserved otherwise; 
(2) iii uXY 2222   , 
where Y1i is the logarithm of the observed wage of each worker i while Y2i denotes her 
unobserved logarithm of reservation wage.
14
 β1 and β2 are parameter vectors. X1i and X2i 
are two row-vectors describing worker’s observable characteristics.  
 
 
In our case, the number of dependent children allows us to identify the possible selectivity 
since some female workers with many children may choose not to work or to avoid 
modern firms with tight time schedule in order to instead take care of their children.
15
  
 We now move to the estimation results. 
                                                
14 See Bougroum and Ibourk (1998) for discussions related to the reservation wage in Morocco. 
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While X1i contains the usual covariates present in Mincer-type wage regressions, such as education, 
experience and training variables, X2i also includes socio-demographic characteristics not present in X1i (for 
example, the number of dependent children, marital status, and geographic origin such as rural or urban) that 
can be used to identify the reservation wage.  As usual, we assume that (u1i, u2i) 
2
1 1 2
2
1 2 2
0
,
0
N
  
  
   
    
    
.  
 Gaussian errors is a usual assumption shared with many methods for correction of self-selection in 
wage equations. The credibility of this assumption is enhanced by the introduction of a dummy for the 
proximity to the minimum wage that contributes to redressing irregularities in the lower tail of the error 
distribution. In this model, the first two truncated centred moments for the first equation can be written as 
E(Y1i | i unobserved) = X1i β1 + ρσ1φ(X2ib2/σ2)/Φ(X2ib2/σ2) and 
V(Y1i | i unobserved) = σ1
2 + (ρσ1)
2[-X2ic2 φ(X2ic2)/Φ(X2ic2)-(φ(X2ic2)/Φ(X2ic2))
2],  
where c2 = b2/σ2. Clearly, the generalised inverse Mills ratio (φ/Φ) in the first moment equation cannot be 
exactly estimated since the non-participants are not observed in our data. However, since X2i includes the 
number of dependent children (ENFT), we can use this variable to detect if selectivity affects wage estimation. 
The role of ENFT in determining the generalised inverse Mills ratio is approximated by a polynomial of 
degree 5 in ENFT.  Fisher tests of the joint significance of Powers of ENFT of order 1 to 5 are implemented 
from the results of quasi-generalised least-squares estimation, which are shown in Section 5.3. 
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5. The Results 
5.1. Task organization 
As mentioned before, better understanding of workers remuneration may be 
obtained by analysing organization inside the firm. We examine three exclusive tasks: 
work in production line, team work and supervision. An individual is considered as 
working in a team when he/she stated performing his/her tasks in collaboration with at 
least two other workers to be performing complementary tasks. Workers in production 
lines are attached to standalone workstation and are fully restricted by the rhythm of the 
production process on this workstation
16
.  
Columns 1 to 6 of Table 3 present the estimation results of a multinomial logit 
model (MNL) where the base alternative is ‘working neither in production lines, nor in 
work teams, nor as a supervisor’. The estimated coefficients inform on the relative 
probabilities of the three considered types of task organization with respect to any other 
type. Hausman test results indicate that the hypothesis of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives is not rejected, which suggests that the MNL specification is appropriate. We 
show estimates with and without firm dummies (with a sector dummy instead, which is 
significant). However, we mostly comment the results with firm dummies. Indeed, 
introducing them much improves the model determination. 
The relative probability of working in production lines is positively associated 
(significantly at the five percent level) with being female worker or belonging to firms 2 
                                                
16 Another possible specification could have been to specify an ordered probit by considering that the tasks 
are ordered according to increasing skills: production line, then work team, then supervisor. However, this 
is not the chosen approach for two reasons. First, there is no necessary ordering between these tasks. For 
example, some team work, such as cleaning jobs in a factory, are not more skill-intensive than production 
line works. Second, the multinomial specification we use should broadly encompass an ordered 
specification. In that case, the ordered structure would somewhat be captured by the estimated coefficients 
of the multinomial model, which does not occur in our estimates. In particular, an ordered model would 
lead to rejection of the hypothesis of the independence of irrelevant alternatives, which is not the case in 
these data, as we discuss below. 
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and 3. It is significantly negatively associated with former relevant internship, 
apprenticeship, education years, and (at the 10 percent level) relative tenure (the ratio of 
tenure to firm age).  
On the other hand, participation in team work is always significantly negatively 
related to relative tenure. It is also negatively related to working in the Textile-clothing 
sector when the corresponding dummy is included in the model. Finally, it is positively 
associated with belonging to firms 2 and 3. 
On the whole, workers assigned to production lines or team work have lower 
human capital than workers assigned to other heterogeneous tasks, which generally require 
higher intellectual capacities in these firms. Unemployment spells seem to keep workers 
out of production line and team work, although it is unclear why. Perhaps higher 
unemployment rates exist in the corresponding occupations. Family circumstances do not 
seem to affect much the task allocation.  
The relative probability of being assigned to supervision tasks is significantly 
negatively associated with unemployment spells; and significantly positively associated 
with former internships, relative tenure, education (at 10 percent level) and belonging to 
firms 2, 3, 5 and 6. These results are consistent with the substantial human capital required 
to fill these positions. Work supervision has been found more efficient in Morocco than in 
some Sub-Saharan countries, perhaps due to higher human capital of supervisors in 
Morocco (Fafchamps and Söderbom, 2006). Firms 1, 4 and 8 are associated with a 
significantly smaller probability of being executive or supervisor, everything else equal. 
These three firms are older than the average with, respectively, 46, 20 and 18 years of 
existence, while the sample mean is 17.6 years. Their workers are older and have more 
total experience than the workers in the other firms, perhaps justifying that they require 
less supervision. These firms have also fewer employees than the other firms of the sample 
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(respectively 104, 100 and 50 employees compared to 228 on average), which also 
diminishes supervision needs. Finally, they display the smallest proportions of employees 
allocated to production lines, which require close supervision.  
These multinomial logit estimates reveal diverse determinants of task allocation. 
First, the technology used in the firm matters. Production lines are used in textile industry 
because the treated fibres need to be transformed in successive stages to obtain the final 
products. In this industry, each worker is responsible for a precisely delimited task and 
working in a team is rare. Meanwhile, the estimates elicit the role of workers’  general 
education and vocational training. Particularly, former internship or apprenticeship would 
allow the workers to access jobs with higher skill intensity than jobs in production lines or 
teams. By contrast, low education workers have a greater probability of working in 
production lines. Also, in the considered sectors in Morocco, uneducated workers (often 
female) are typically employed in production lines. While these jobs are seen as little 
attractive, many workers are confined to them because of strict gender roles in the 
Moroccan labour context. Finally, having spent a relatively long time in the firm where 
the worker is observed seems to allow her to integrate work teams and to access 
supervision positions more easily. 
 
5.2. On-the-Job Training 
Promoting on-the-job training (OJT) seems to be a promising policy in Morocco. 
Indeed, investment in OJT allows the labour force to adjust to new international market 
demands faster than general education. This is important because trade liberalisation in 
Morocco may deplete wages in the traded good sector (Arbache, Dickerson and Green, 
2004).  
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To investigate how OJT takes place, in the next stage of our recursive model, we 
estimate: (1) a Probit model of participation in OJT, and (2) a Tobit model of OJT 
duration. The independent variables include demographic characteristics associated with 
workers’ preferences and family constraints, former education variables, which are again 
related to preferences while also to the worker’s capability to attend additional training, 
relative tenure, experience off the firm, unemployment spells, and the previously analysed 
types of tasks (production line, team, supervisor) that may affect his/her selection for 
training in the firm. Firm dummies are not included in the probit models because a few 
firms use too little OJT to make firm-specific estimation reasonable. However, it remains 
possible to include firm dummies in the Tobit model. The results are reported in columns 1 
to 3 of Table 4. In column 2, the workstation variables are crossed with the two main 
human capital variables (education and relative tenure) to test for differentiated effects 
across human capital levels.  
The estimates presented in these three columns show that most included socio-
demographic characteristics (age – not even included in the final specification, number of 
children and gender) and some labour market personal characteristics (internship, 
unemployment, relative tenure, being supervisor, proximity to SMIG – now omitted) have 
non-significant coefficients.  
Working in the Textile-clothing sector appears to be clearly detrimental to OJT 
participation and OJT duration, while general education is positively correlated with OJT 
participation and duration. Indeed, Textile-clothing is little capital intensive, while 
unskilled labour intensive. Moroccan garment companies were very few to provide formal 
OJT in 1997. By contrast, the IMMEE sector is relatively human capital intensive, 
especially its electronics branch. It is therefore more prone to provide OJT, at a time when 
new technologies are being introduced. 
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Workers with large off-firm experience have fewer chances of being selected for 
OJT, and when they are, they benefit from a shorter training duration. It may be that only 
workers relatively new in the labour force are worth training. Experienced workers often 
already know the skills of the trade, or may have revealed mediocre learning capacity. 
Interestingly, being married is negatively associated with OJT participation (at 10 
percent level), while it has no significant effect on OJT duration. This result may come 
from the additional stress on time use caused by OJT sessions, which is hard to reconcile 
with an harmonious family life (Bourquia, 1999). In that sense, single workers may be 
more available for additional training.
17
 
Two types of task organization significantly influence the OJT likelihood and 
duration: production line and team work. However, the impact of work organization (in 
column 2) on the OJT probability becomes really salient when it is allowed to vary 
according to the worker’s education and relative tenure. Workers attached to work teams 
have more chances than average workers to receive OJT when their education level is high. 
On the other hand, more educated and tenured workers in production lines have more 
chances to receive OJT than other workers. So, what seems to matter for OJT selection is a 
minimal human capital threshold, associated with tasks involving co-workers in teams as 
well as tasks within production lines. By contrast, workers assigned to supervision tasks do 
not generally receive OJT, perhaps because they are already sufficiently skilled and 
knowledgeable
18
. On the whole, there is evidence, consistently with our recursive 
approach, that work organization affects OJT. 
 
                                                
17 Because of the small sample size we avoid inteacting the gender dummy with other coefficients in order 
to preserve degrees of freedom. Besides, we checked that incorporating many interacted terms only yielded 
more insignificant coefficients. 
18 Note that crossed effects of human capital with task organization variables are insignificant in the Tobit 
model of OJT duration. Then, while OJT probability varies according to the workers’ human capital and 
assigned task, their OJT duration does not. 
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5.3. Wages 
 We are now ready to comment the wage equation results, starting with a few words 
on selectivity tests discussed in Section 4. The added polynomial terms in the variable 
‘number of children’, introduced to test selectivity, are found non-significantly different 
from zero (the P-values of the tests are respectively 0.125, 0.227 and 0.115 for the above-
mentioned augmented equations corresponding to equations (1) to (5) in Table 5). Similar 
tests based on Weighed Least-Squares estimates to account for the possible presence of the 
variable ‘number of children’ in the variance of the truncated sample still yield stronger 
non-rejection of the hypothesis of no selectivity. These results suggest that there is no 
obvious evidence of selectivity bias in these data, provided fertility can be considered as 
sufficiently disconnected to human capital accumulation. We now comment the OLS 
estimates of the wage equations, omitting insignificant selectivity terms. These equations 
include OJT and task organization variables. 
Column (1) reports the coefficient estimates obtained with a wage regression 
including a sector dummy while specifications (2) to (5) use firm dummies in lieu of the 
sector indicator. Introducing firm dummies, of which that of Firms 1, 2 and 3 have 
significant coefficients, substantially changes the estimates of the coefficients of tenure, 
and of some organization and training variables. This suggests that other coefficients may 
not be constant across firms, although such non-constant effects cannot be estimated with 
the small sample size. Then, the firm dummies model is our preferred specification. 
One issue in OLS estimates is that human capital and training variables may be 
endogenous, yielding inconsistent estimates. Unfortunately, we do not avail of 
instrumental variables (IV) to deal with this problem. Besides, because of the small sample 
size, our attempts at estimating 2SLS versions of the OLS estimates produced altogether 
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insignificant results, useless for any inference purpose. There is just not enough 
information to use IV estimators in these data.  
In the case of human capital variables, there is nothing that can be done to alleviate 
the endogeneity problem. However, how serious this problem is, remains unclear. Some 
authors end up suggesting that OLS estimates may often be superior to IV estimators in the 
absence of exceptional instruments that are very rarely found in empirical work (Card, 
1999). We follow Card’s approach. 
Education, off-firm experience and relative tenure all positively affect wages. 
Though, the impact of relative tenure is decreasing with the tenure duration. The estimated 
effect is only 3-4% increase in wages with every year of education and 2.8% with one 
more year of off-firm experience.  The returns to human capital seems to be a bit low 
regarding education, while high for off-firm experience. For example, four years of college 
would add between 12 to 16 percent to a worker's wage, not much more than working for 
four years prior to getting a job (4 time 2 to 3 percent).
19
 In columns (3) and (5), we report 
estimates excluding relative tenure since tenure cannot be well instrumented in these data. 
We find that while the estimated coefficient on the education variable diminishes when 
omitting tenure, the qualitative aspect of our main results – especially the coefficients on 
the OJT and task organization variables – remains unchanged. In particular, the duration of 
OJT has a strong positive impact on wages in specifications (2) to (5). However, neither 
former internship, nor former apprenticeship significantly affects wages in these data. 
Other worker characteristics influence wages. Female workers are significantly less paid 
than male workers (at the 10 percent level)
20
. On the contrary, the proximity to the 
minimum wage does not seem to affect wage levels.  
                                                
19 We also considered introducing years of schooling and off-firm experience in a non-linear fashion 
(adding squared terms) but obtained insignificant results. 
20 See Nordman (2004) for gender issues with these data and more broadly Nordman and Wolff (2009) for 
gender issues in the Moroccan manufacturing sector. 
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Let us now turn to the task organization variables. Working in a team or in a 
production line does not much affect remunerations, even when these variables are crossed 
by education level (specifications 4 and 5). By contrast, executives or supervisors are much 
better paid, as expected. On the whole, the impact of task organization variables on worker 
remuneration remains much less important than that of human capital characteristics in 
these data. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we conduct a case study of the linkages of task organization, human 
capital accumulation and wages in Morocco using a matched worker-firm data of eight 
exporting firms in two industrial sectors. The interpretation of the results is carried through 
an hypothetised recursive model, representing task organization, on-the-job training (OJT) 
and remunerations as consequences of successive joint decisions of firms and workers.  
The estimates of models of involvement in production lines, in team work, or in 
supervision tasks – our variables describing work organization in the firm – exhibit clear 
interactions of human capital accumulation with these occupation characteristics. Low 
human capital workers and workers without former internship and apprenticeship are more 
often confined to production lines than other workers. By contrast, high education, tenure, 
off-firm experience, former internship and the absence of unemployment spells are 
important factors to access executive or supervisor positions, characterized by high 
earnings levels. 
OJT involvement appears to be constrained by three conditions: a relevant 
industrial location (textile firms require little formal OJT owing to task simplicity); 
minimal human capital (in the form of education, tenure or off-firm experience); and an 
appropriate family situation (single workers may adapt more easily to the time constraints 
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associated with OJT). Moreover, we find that task organization exerts differentiated effects 
on OJT participation, depending on the workers’ schooling level. More educated and 
tenured workers in production lines or work teams have more chances to receive OJT than 
their poorly educated counterparts. In these data, the workers already occupying 
supervision positions do not generally participate in OJT. 
Task allocations affect worker wages mostly because supervision tasks are much 
better remunerated than other tasks. However, the impact of task organization on wages 
may also take place through its influence on OJT, which contributes to raising wages. 
Overall, OJT is found to largely improve worker remunerations and seems often to be 
determined by previous task allocation. As a consequence, the Moroccan government 
could subsidize OJT to promote workers productivity and wages, notably for workers 
employed in teams or in production lines. In that way, OJT may contribute to firm 
responses to the new international competition. However, what our estimates show is that 
OJT participation and assignment to tasks liable to require OJT is somewhat conditional on 
the workers already reaching a minimum human capital level, whether in terms of 
professional experience or education.  
Our results suggest policy implications, although caution should be taken not to 
extrapolate results for a few firms to the whole Moroccan manufacturing or more broadly.  
It has been observed that in Morocco of the 1990s the stagnation of earnings was 
attributable to the growth of the low-paying sector of the economy, and this may still be 
valid nowadays. On the other hand, at this period, only four percent of the Moroccan firms 
engaged in formal training, whereas earnings and productivity in such firms were much 
higher.  
Technical change and intensifying competition due to trade liberalization imply 
more advanced skills and higher productivity from workers. Skills upgrade is also 
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important for social policy so as to enhance the earnings of destitute populations in 
Morocco, who are increasingly politically active as recent unrest has shown.  
In these conditions, the private sector may crucially contribute to overhauling the labour 
force skills through OJT programmes. This is important because the public educational 
system is not adequately responding to the needs of the productive system, as emphasized 
in Achy (2005). We also found that OJT is partly determined by a minimum education 
level of the trained workers. Sustainable OJT programmes should be supported by the 
public education system, e.g. through vocational and technical institutes. Subsidies to 
stimulate within-firm OJT programmes may also be useful if they lead firms to 
substantially raise their training initiatives.  
The government could co-ordinate long-run general education policies with 
policies addressing vocational training since both OJT and education affect wages that 
are closely related to productivity. What seems to be needed is therefore a joint policy of 
education and OJT promotion. This would involve better coordination of labour training 
policies, which are currently led separately by the Ministry of education and the OFPPT 
in Morocco (Office de la Formation Professionnelle et de la Promotion du Travail).  
Public aid to OJT could benefit from being designed so that it answers genuine 
industrial needs in a way that accounts for the relevant technological and family 
constraints. For example, training female workers may be efficient if those workers can be 
relieved from some of their domestic tasks and if mentalities about gender roles can 
evolve. 
 
Our results exhibit the dependence of task organization and on-the-job training on 
the general education process. There is also a growing interest in workplace learning 
processes, described as ‘informal’ in the literature. Several studies show that the impact of 
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training is greater on the firm performances when training takes place in connection with 
changes in work organization and employment structures (Black and Lynch, 1996; 
Fleisher, Dong and Liu, 1996). In a Moroccan context of swift opening to international 
competition, exporting Moroccan firms would gain from better knowledge of the 
simultaneous determinants of classical human capital accumulation, OJT and task 
organization practices
21
. This paper is a first step in the exploration of these complex 
issues, which would require the constitution of large databases covering all these 
dimensions. 
 
                                                
21 As in Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002). 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the workers’ characteristics  
Number of observations 203 
 Mean Std dev. min max 
Age of individual (AGE) 30.41 8.23 16 59 
Sex (FEMALE, 1: female; 0 male; conversely for MALE) 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Geographical origin (PROVE, 1: rural area; 0 otherwise) 0.82 0.37 0 1 
Matrimonial status (MARI, 1: if married; 0 if divorced, widowed or single) 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Number of dependent children (ENFT) 0.79 1.36 0 7 
Individual never went to school (ANALPHA, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.05 0.22 0 1 
Individual went to Koranic school only (KORAN, 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.10 0.30 0 1 
Years of completed schooling (EDUCATION) 9.78 9.78 0 18 
Previous apprenticeship in a firm (APPRENTI, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Years of internship related to the current job (STAGA) 0.14 0.33 0 2 
Years of internship not related to the current job (STAGAN) 0.06 0.29 0 2 
Vocational degree related to the current job (ETUTPA; 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Vocational degree not related to the current job (ETUTP; 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.13 0.34 0 1 
Unemployment spells (in years, CHOMA) 1.53 2.28 0 10 
Previous relevant experience (EMSIM,  1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Previous off firm potential professional experience (EXPERIENCE, in years) 5.49 7.12 0 49.08 
Starting date in the current firm (ENTREE)  1990.69 5.11 1975 1998 
Tenure in the current firm (TENURE, in years) 6.00 5.30 0 21.25 
Formal On-the-Job Training in the current firm (FORMAD ; 1: yes; 0 otherwise)  0.30 0.45 0 1 
Formal On-the-Job Training in the current firm (FORMAA, in years)  0.12 0.249 0 2 
Work in team (EQUIPE, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Work in production lines (LINE, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Executive or supervisor (ENCADR, 1: yes; 0 otherwise) 0.24 0.42 0 1 
Proximity to the minimum wage (SMIG, 1: if 1600<=SAL<=1700; 0 otherwise) 0.17 0.37 0 1 
     
Firms’ fixed effects     
Firm 1  0.079 0.270 0 1 
Firm 2 0.197 0.399 0 1 
Firm 3 0.143 0.351 0 1 
Firm 4 0.133 0.340 0 1 
Firm 5 0.167 0.374 0 1 
Firm 6 0.099 0.299 0 1 
Firm 7 0.103 0.305 0 1 
Firm 8 0.079 0.270 0 1 
     
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of monthly wages (in dirhams) 
Number of observations 203 
 Mean Std dev. min max 
Monthly wage  2689 2019 750 20000 
Monthly wage in IMMEE 3101 1930 750 12000 
Monthly wage in Textile-clothing 2281 2030 750 20000 
Mean wage in:     
Firm 1 (IMMEE) 4586 3237 2200 12000 
Firm 2 (IMMEE) 2337 1120 750 7500 
Firm 3 (IMMEE) 3398 1791 1700 9000 
Firm 4 (Textile-clothing) 2192 761 1150 5000 
Firm 5 (Textile-clothing) 1974 813 750 5000 
Firm 6 (Textile-clothing) 1888 519 1500 3500 
Firm 7 (Textile-clothing) 3267 4168 1040 20000 
Firm 8 (IMMEE) 2984 1015 1250 4500 
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Table 3. Multinomial Logit Models of Task Allocation 
Dependent variable: POSTE (production line=1; work team=2; exe./super.=3) 
 with sector dummy with firm dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 production line work team executive /super. production line work team executive /super. 
Dummy for female  3.9485*** 0.1751 1.0783*** 2.5532** 0.3464 -0.5753 
 (3.42) (0.15) (2.70) (2.36) (0.55) (0.58) 
Matrimonial situation (MARI) -0.2004 -2.0739 -0.0505 0.0039 -1.3103 0.0652 
 (0.20) (1.58) (0.07) (0.00) (1.48) (0.07) 
Number of dependent children (ENFT) -0.3144 -0.0477 0.0269 -0.1883 -0.0872 0.3919 
 (0.88) (0.15) (0.10) (0.97) (0.40) (1.15) 
Years of completed schooling (EDUCATION) -0.4726*** -0.3611*** 0.1289 -0.5295*** -0.1307 0.3061* 
 (4.21) (4.05) (0.97) (4.67) (1.55) (1.85) 
Former apprenticeship (APPRENTI) -2.0650*** -1.2744 0.0786 -1.8628*** -1.1117 0.5021 
 (3.37) (1.18) (0.13) (2.99) (1.23) (0.68) 
Job related vocational degree (ETUTPA) -0.0340 -0.2763 0.7889 0.6207 -0.2479 0.7231 
 (0.04) (0.21) (1.10) (0.71) (0.23) (0.72) 
Former work-relevant internship (STAGA) -1.6934*** 0.5823 1.1472* -1.7786*** 0.6490 2.0645** 
 (2.61) (1.05) (1.82) (3.59) (1.04) (2.11) 
Unemployment spells (CHOMA) -0.1863 0.0113 -0.2343*** -0.2241** -0.0927 -0.2924*** 
 (1.17) (0.05) (3.02) (2.14) (0.53) (3.14) 
Relative tenure (TENURE / firm age = PANCIE) -1.0276 -2.5563*** 1.5297** -1.5825* -1.4458** 3.7510*** 
 (1.29) (3.80) (2.17) (1.68) (2.25) (3.50) 
Off firm experience (EXPERIENCE) -0.0370 -0.0394 0.0465 -0.0513 -0.0014 0.1090 
 (0.65) (0.38) (0.96) (1.11) (0.02) (1.54) 
Dummy for Textile-clothing 0.7555 -3.9145*** 0.1473    
 (0.73) (3.56) (0.15)    
Firm 2    3.1253*** 1.7655** 4.9771*** 
    (3.13) (1.99) (3.13) 
Firm 3    -0.1492 1.7127** 3.8358*** 
    (0.22) (1.97) (4.12) 
Firm 5    1.8706*** -0.0963 4.1890*** 
    (3.03) (0.15) (7.24) 
Firm 6    0.8583 -0.4784 5.2357*** 
    (1.57) (0.57) (3.81) 
Constant 4.7260*** 6.4747*** -3.3188*** 5.4494*** 1.6590 -9.2027*** 
 (2.60) (5.50) (2.63) (3.89) (1.25) (3.73) 
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195 
Log likelihood -156.2 
0.40 
-147.1 
0.45 Pseudo R-squared 
Hausman tests of IIA: H0 
“Odds are independent of other alternatives” (chi2) 
1.52 0.39 1.64 2.69 -1.30 0.99 
Observations  203   203  
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Absolute values of robust z statistics to firm clustering are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** mean significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. In the MNL model, the reference group 
is made of individuals working neither in production lines, nor in work teams, nor as supervisor or executive (23% of the sample). The estimates are weighted by the inverse 
probability that workers are surveyed within each firm. 
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Table 4. Participation and Duration in On-the-Job Training 
 
 Probit of 
participation in 
past or current OJT 
(FORMAD) 
Probit of 
participation in 
past or current OJT 
 (FORMAD) 
Tobit of duration 
of past or current 
OJT 
(FORMAA) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dummy for female 0.0981 0.1528 -0.0219 
 (0.27) (0.40) (020) 
Matrimonial situation (MARI) -0.6877* -0.7424* -0.2559 
 (1.90) (1.76) (1.51) 
Number of dependent children (ENFT) 0.1007 0.0814 0.0917 
 (0.63) (0.55) (1.35) 
EDUCATION 0.2888*** 0.1258** 0.0635** 
 (6.26) (2.42) (2.35) 
Job related vocational degree (ETUTPA) -0.3930 -0.2680 -0.1380* 
 (0.85) (0.60) (1.97) 
Former work-relevant internship (STAGA) 0.1856 0.3914 0.1963 
 (0.37) (0.91) (0.60) 
Unemployment spells (CHOMA) 0.1141 0.1240 0.0550 
 (0.94) (1.44) (1.04) 
TENURE / firm age (PANCIE) 0.5365 0.3477 0.0148 
 (1.15) (0.55) (0.08) 
Off firm experience (EXPERIENCE) -0.0928*** -0.0805*** -0.0649** 
 (3.22) (3.21) (2.48) 
Dummy for Textile-clothing -1.5673*** -1.5265***  
 (3.65) (3.52)  
Dummy for executive/supervisor (ENCADR) 0.3646 0.6325 0.1896 
 (1.10) (1.57) (1.34) 
Dummy for production line (CHAINE) 0.9105** -4.0310*** 0.0775** 
 (2.23) (3.72) (2.10) 
Dummy for work team (EQUIPE) 0.6569 -1.4552 0.1377 
 (1.47) (1.08) (1.09) 
EDUCATION*CHAINE  0.3852***  
  (4.59)  
PANCIE*CHAINE  1.5989**  
  (2.32)  
EDUCATION*EQUIPE  0.1902**  
  (2.35)  
PANCIE*EQUIPE  -1.3221  
  (1.41)  
Firm 1   0.6980*** 
   (4.35) 
Firm 2   0.4858*** 
   (3.63) 
Firm 7   0.0325 
   (0.25) 
Constant -3.6454*** -1.6583** -0.9757** 
 (3.99) (1.99) (2.33) 
Observations 203 203 203 
Pseudo R-squared 0.55 0.58 0.52 
Absolute values of robust z statistics to firm clustering are in parentheses. *, ** and *** mean significant at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. In column (3), there are three firm dummies included because only four firms provide OJT. The 
estimates are weighted by the inverse probability that workers are selected within firms. APPRENTI dropped because 
no apprentices received OJT. 
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Table 5. Log Monthly Wage Equations 
     
 OLS with 
sector dummy 
OLS with firm 
dummies 
OLS with firm 
dummies 
OLS with firm 
dummies 
OLS with 
firm dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dummy for female -0.2275* -0.1494 -0.1672** -0.1568* -0.1704** 
 (-2.35) (-1.88) (-3.02) (-2.02) (-3.16) 
EDUCATION 0.0251 0.0385*** 0.0262* 0.0455*** 0.0320* 
 (1.87) (4.45) (2.27) (3.56) (2.00) 
Former work-relevant internship 
(STAGA) 
0.1622 0.1589 0.1504 0.1584 0.1428 
(1.37) (1.25) (1.09) (1.28) (1.06) 
Former apprenticeship (APPRENTI) 0.0481 0.0636 0.0592 0.0764 0.0698 
 (0.56) (0.78) (0.80) (0.90) (0.90) 
Proximity to the minimum wage (SMIG) -0.0098 0.0533 -0.0248 0.0472 -0.0268 
 (-0.11) (0.94) (-0.32) (0.80) (-0.33) 
Unemployment spells (CHOMA) -0.0281** -0.0242* -0.0207 -0.0240* -0.0209 
 (-2.57) (-1.92) (-1.53) (-2.07) (-1.64) 
TENURE / firm age (PANCIE) 0.4660*** 0.7279***  0.7203***  
 (4.99) (5.31)  (5.11)  
 PANCIE squared -0.2120*** -0.2814***  -0.2668**  
 (-3.77) (-3.66)  (-3.29)  
Off firm experience (EXPERIENCE) 0.0284** 0.0282** 0.0280** 0.0292** 0.0282** 
 (3.36) (3.25) (3.20) (3.20) (3.06) 
 EXPERIENCE squared -0.0004* -0.0003 -0.0004* -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (-1.92) (-1.51) (-1.99) (-1.48) (-1.75) 
Dummy for executive/supervisor 
(ENCADR) 
0.3157*** 0.3334*** 0.3935*** 0.3148** 0.3845*** 
(4.08) (3.74) (4.35) (3.29) (4.00) 
Dummy for production line (CHAINE) -0.0495 0.0087 -0.0185 0.1353 0.0644 
 (-1.25) (0.14) (-0.25) (0.84) (0.37) 
Dummy for work team (EQUIPE) -0.0111 -0.0796 -0.1459 0.0309 0.0913 
 (-0.14) (-1.23) (-1.83) (0.13) (0.32) 
EDUCATION*CHAINE    -0.0138 -0.0087 
    (-1.08) (-0.61) 
EDUCATION*EQUIPE    -0.0098 -0.0209 
    (-0.52) (-0.97) 
On-the-Job Training duration (FORMAA) 0.2190 0.2643*** 0.3040*** 0.2693*** 0.3018*** 
 (1.28) (6.25) (5.18) (6.05) (5.13) 
Dummy for Textile-clothing -0.1522     
 (-1.28)     
Firm 1  0.3667*** 0.4022*** 0.3584*** 0.4163*** 
  (7.64) (6.98) (8.25) (6.92) 
Firm 2  -0.1885*** -0.0131 -0.1732*** -0.0004 
  (-6.07) (-0.36) (-6.45) (-0.01) 
Firm 3  0.3749*** 0.4600*** 0.3681*** 0.4549*** 
  (14.05) (21.80) (14.02) (20.10) 
Firm 4  -0.0276 0.0566 -0.0323 0.0624 
  (-0.45) (0.95) (-0.54) (1.06) 
Firm 5  0.0023 0.0396 -0.0008 0.0423 
  (0.08) (1.36) (-0.03) (1.35) 
Firm 7  -0.0576 0.1081** -0.0697 0.1090** 
  (-1.17) (2.73) (-1.33) (2.60) 
Firm 8  0.0439 0.2591*** 0.0382 0.2565*** 
  (0.86) (5.27) (0.72) (5.06) 
Constant 7.3702*** 6.9527*** 7.2174*** 6.8801*** 7.1542*** 
 (26.66) (42.65) (38.71) (34.83) (30.39) 
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Observations 203 203 203 203 203 
R-squared 0.59 0.71 0.65 0.71 0.65 
Absolute values of robust t statistics to firm clustering are in parentheses. *, ** and *** mean significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
  
 
 
